North Korea’s nuclear and missile arsenal is growing; its weapons are becoming more powerful; and its threshold for nuclear weapons use is low. In any future Korean conflict, Pyongyang will almost certainly threaten nuclear strikes against American targets to deter US involvement, as America’s alliance commitment to South Korea requires. Those nuclear threats raise tough questions about how fully the US will meet that alliance commitment. (In the Ukraine war, Washington has not run a similar risk; Russian nuclear threats have successfully limited US support for Kyiv.) In America, Trump has so deeply remade the Republican party that any successor will likely share his disdain for US allies and commitments.

These accelerating trends have, unsurprisingly, accelerated ROK nuclear interest. Today, 71% of South Koreans support indigenous nuclearization. ROK elites are more divided, but the country’s foreign policy community – think-tanks, national security intellectuals, major op-ed pages – supports nuclearization more than at any time since indigenous nuclear weapons were first considered in the 1970s. That community is now engaged in extensive track II discussions with its American counterpart on this issue.

The US strongly opposes ROK nuclearization. It tried to allay Seoul’s fears with a recent joint statement – 2023’s ‘Washington Declaration.’ That reasserted US security commitments to South Korea, while reaffirming South Korean participation in the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). NPT membership prevents ROK nuclearization. But the declaration did not shift ROK public opinion nor slow elite drift toward nuclear options. US opposition is also unchanged. Track II discussions have suggested that the US might sanction South Korea to prevent its nuclearization. Indeed, American opposition is likely the primary reason South Korea is still in the NPT. An alliance collision looms.

This brewing confrontation is unnecessary. ROK nuclearization would be far less traumatic than Washington, especially the US nonproliferation community, thinks. The proliferation downsides are exaggerated; the local deterrence benefits, including to America itself, are underappreciated; and US liberal values – the very ideological commitments which distinguish US alliances – imply toleration of democratic partners’ national security choices, even when America dislikes them.

- Author (Pusan National University): Robert E Kelly (Department of Political Science and Diplomacy)

- Title of original paper: “Why South Korea Should Go Nuclear”

- Journal: Foreign Affairs

- Web link: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/north-korea/why-south-korea-should-go-nuclear-kelly-kim